The Jones Act was sold as a shield for American shipbuilding and seafaring. The numbers tell a different story. The fleet of large oceangoing vessels subject to the law fell from 257 in 1980 to 96 by mid-2021 ^[5]. That is a 63% decline in four decades. Fewer than 100 such vessels remain ^[8]. The law that requires U.S.-built, U.S.-flagged, U.S.-owned and U.S.-crewed ships for domestic waterborne trade has not kept the fleet alive ^[16]. It has presided over its shrinkage. Why? The costs are punishing. A 2011 MARAD report found operating a Jones Act-compliant vessel costs $12,600 more per day than an open registry ship, with almost 90% from higher crew costs ^[2]. A 2022 GAO report put the additional annual cost at about $6.2 to $6.5 million, or nearly $17,000 per day ^[3]. Building a tanker in the U.S. costs about double what it does in foreign shipyards ^[4]. U.S.-flagged vessels face a 2.7 times higher daily operating cost than equivalent foreign-flagged vessels, according to a 2010 MARAD study ^[11]. Crew costs alone are 5.3 times higher ^[12]. The law's defenders say it protects national security. But the military utility of the Jones Act fleet has faded because modern warfare requires transport ships that are fast and flexible ^[10]. As of 2019, the few American shipyards that can build commercial oceangoing vessels are kept afloat by defense contracts ^[9]. The Jones Act has failed in its broader mission to protect the nation's shipbuilding industry ^[7]. A 2019 OECD projection stated that abolishing the Jones Act would result in net economic gains for the US, including for the shipbuilding industry ^[1]. The law is Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 ^[15]. It is more than a century old. The fleet it was supposed to sustain is a fraction of what it was. The read here is that the law is the problem, not the solution.